Introduction
The shift of global financial investment activity away from the advanced world toward emerging economies has been widely documented, and nowhere is this shift more evident than in recent patterns of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals. Between 1997 and 2003, companies based in emerging economies engaged in outbound cross-border M&A deals worth $189 billion, or 4 percent of the total value of all global cross-border M&A investment. In the equivalent period from 2004 to 2010, that amount had increased to $1.1 trillion, or 17 percent of the global total. This sharp rise in emerging economies' share of cross-border M&A has been accompanied by a deepening reach of emerging-market firms in international capital markets overall, not just via foreign direct investment (FDI) but also through equity cross-listings, participation in international loan syndicates, and debt issues on international bond markets.
Given the rising importance of emerging economies in international M&A, the question of what forces drive their investment activity becomes ever more important. In particular, do cross-border M&A choices by emerging market firms differ systematically across destination markets, and if so, what are the dimensions in which these choices differ?
This question is increasingly pertinent as government regulators grapple with the dramatic pickup in M&A investment by Southern firms in both Northern markets-exemplified by Chinese carmaker Geely's high-profile acquisition of Sweden's Volvo from Ford in 2010-as well as (and perhaps more importantly) their purchasing activities in the other developing economies of the South. Indeed, the trend of rising South-North and South-South M&A activity suggests yet another wrinkle to the Lucas (1990) paradox of "uphill" South-North capital flows: It is not sufficient for theoretical explanations to merely explain why emerging market firms may be investing in (ostensibly) less risky Northern markets, but also why they may choose to invest in other economies that are otherwise very similar to their own (insofar as their level of development is concerned), rather than investing at home. This paper seeks to examine the factors associated with the flow of M&A investment originating in emerging market economies. 1 The empirical analysis relies on bilateral outbound cross-border M&A data for firms based in 61 emerging markets, collected for the period between 1997 and 2010. This coverage includes economies from all major developing regions, which makes this, to our knowledge, one of the most comprehensive analyses of bilateral M&A activity by the Global South.
The picture of Southern cross-border M&A that emerges from our paper is a fairly sophisticated one. Consistent with other forms of cross-border economic activity, M&A deals reflect standard gravity components, such as economic size and distance. But the strength of existing trading and investment relationships also matter, and for acquisitions in advanced economy targets, the informational advantages gleaned from such prior economic relationships appear to overcome frictions due to physical distance. Moreover, deals in advanced economies tend to reflect the extent to which FDI can substitute for direct exporting activity, or offer possible diversification benefits. In contrast, acquisitions in other emerging countries tend to be associated more with considerations of factor price differentials. Finally, the ease of financial access-both in the home and host economies-appears to facilitate M&A transactions, a result consistent with the notion that limitations to trade flows may be overcome by substituting capital flows for goods exports.
We also fit our empirical model of M&A deals to a set of growth assumptions for emerging and advanced economies to obtain a projection of outbound cross-border M&A by emerging market firms for the period 2010-25. Under plausible scenarios of relative growth rates, we find that M&A activity is expected to recover from the crisis-induced decline, and grow at an average of 8.2 percent annually over the period. This respectable rate nevertheless represents a moderation in the rate of growth relative to the past, where-for the decade leading up to the crisis (1998-08)-average annual growth was significantly higher, at 14.3 percent.
Our findings corroborate, and extend, the existing literature in several ways. Existing empirical papers on FDI have tended to focus on testing one theoretical framework against another (Braconier, Norbäck & Urban 2005; Brainard 1997 Rossi & Volpin 2004) , these have tended to be relatively limited in terms of time period and/or country coverage, and none have explicitly focused on M&A by emerging economies. Finally, unlike several recent papers, we eschew an explicit focus on policy-or politically-related factors driving FDI-such as political risk (Busse & Hefeker 2007) or investment agreements (Büthe & Milner 2008; Neumayer & Spess 2005) -and instead embed these factors in our overall gravity framework.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we describe some broad stylized patterns of M&A activity originating from emerging economies (Section 2). This is followed by an overview, in Section 3, of the different theoretical streams that have informed economists' understanding of bilateral M&A (and FDI, more generally). Section 4 follows with a description of the dataset, econometric specification, and estimation methodology. Benchmark results and robustness checks follow (Section 5), before a final section concludes with some brief thoughts on policy and future research directions. Although not the focus of this paper, it is illuminative to consider, by way of comparison, whether patterns in emerging market M&A are also replicated in the other component of FDI, greenfield activity. 2 The share of emerging market greenfield investment did indeed rise between 2001 and 2009 (the latest year data are available), from 12 to 15 percent of total global greenfield activity. This rise, while clearly more modest, was nevertheless a significant absolute increase: the value of cross-border greenfield investment rose from an estimated $98 billion to $250 billion over the same period. 3 2 Greenfield investment, as opposed to M&A, typically represents internal, organic corporate growth, while M&A activity, in addition to satisfying growth objectives, may capture other more complex corporate goals, such as strategic market penetration or the acquisition of new technology.
3 Greenfield data were sourced from UNCTAD and fDi Markets but were, unfortunately, only available for 2003 through 2009. The value for 2001 given here is an exponential projection from the available time series, and is not meant to be an authoritative figure, but rather to give a sense of the magnitude involved. As may be expected, large and fast-growing emerging economies are responsible for the bulk of cross-border M&A activity. China is the single largest emerging market source country for M&A deals, and accounts for $80 and $132 billion of the total $426 and $698 billion invested in emerging and advanced economies, respectively, over the 1997-2010 time period. Other emerging economies with significant presence among source countries include Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, 4 India, and Russia (see Figure 2) . Much of these flows are destined for developed markets-primarily the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia-but China, Singapore, and Brazil are major destination markets as well.
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In terms of sectoral composition, the major emerging market M&A transactions appear in high-value, nontradable service sectors: financial services (the top sector for cross-border M&A activity among emerging-market firms, amounting to $227 million of the total of $1.12 billion for 1997-2010), telecommunications (a distant second, amounting to $103 million), resource extraction, and utilities. There is little difference in the sectoral composition of M&A deals in emerging versus advanced economies, which suggests that, to the extent that there are distinct patterns between Southern and Northern investments, they lie more in the nature of the respective economies, rather than in the type of businesses involved. 5 4 The relatively high standing of Singapore and the UAE, in spite of their relatively small size, is attributable to the large number of sovereign wealth fund acquisitions in these economies. Singapore's Temasek Holdings and GIC Real Estate, for instance, accounted for 32 and 31 deals, respectively, in the sample period.
5 The sectoral distribution differs somewhat when considering the number, rather than value, of deals, with 
Potential Factors Related to M&A Activity
Economic models of bilateral trade flows have most successfully been modeled on the basis of an empirical gravity equation, which has more recently been contextualized in the form of a broad variety of theoretical models (Anderson & van Wincoop 2004) . We therefore rely, as a point of departure, on a gravity equation, where cross-border M&A flows are positively related to the pair's respective output and negatively related to the bilateral distance between them.
Bilateral country distances capture not only explicit trade costs associated with shipping and transportation, but could also embed implicit transactions costs related to the deteriorating quality of an investor's (or acquirer's) knowledge of, and ability to obtain information about, a potential acquisition target as physical distances between the two countries increase (in line with the argument made by Loungani, Mody & Razin (2002) ). Naturally, existing bilateral trade flows are also likely to be associated with bilateral M&A flows.
sectors such as professional and technical services, and electronics manufacturing featuring more prominently in emerging market M&A deals. However, the pattern of overlap in South-North and South-South remains the same.
6 Such staged investment strategies emphasize the real-option aspects. Consequently, the initial greenfield investment serves is a stepping-stone to understanding a local economy. As uncertainties about demand and supply become resolved over time, follow-up investments then create a permanent presence in the foreign market by extending the scope and reach of the initial unit. Gilroy & Lukas (2006) provide the theoretical justification for this phenomenon, while Brouthers & Dikova (2010) establish empirical evidence.
In addition to this baseline, however, we supplement the model with a range of theories that have been put forward to explain cross-border investment activity.
The first class of theories posit that companies seek growth opportunities abroad as they outgrow their home markets; a problem especially acute in developing countries. The decision of multinationals to either horizontally expand to access foreign markets or vertically integrate production across borders, in turn, depends on both market size and the ability to exploit factor price differentials between the two production locations (Helpman & Krugman 1985; Markusen 2002; Markusen & Venables 1998) . This result, which relies on relative factor proportions, suggests that, in addition to absolute GDP, per capita incomes-as a proxy for factor costscould be important for M&A choices.
Of course, the implications of the factor proportions hypothesis is not limited to contemporaneous differences in factor prices, but also possible future differentials. Consequently, relative growth in both home and destination countries could affect deal flows. This hypothesis can thus be further tested by including variables that measure GDP and sectoral growth rates. Following this rationale, faster growth in the home (host) country will exert greater pressure on domestic (foreign) factor prices and hence increase (reduce) incentives to engage in cross-border M&A. 7
A second class of theories revolves around structural economic characteristics of the home and host countries, especially those related to the extent of trade openness (Brainard 1997; Helpman et al. 2004; Horstmann & Markusen 1992 ), but also with regard to differential access to finance (either domestic or international), or differences in the speed of diffusion of technological advances. This tradeoff-between proximity to the customer versus concentration of production-tends to privilege the former especially when transport costs and trade barriers are substantial or, conversely, when economies of scale favoring home production and subsequently exporting are relatively low.
Indeed, for economies heavily invested in high-fixed, low-marginal cost activities such as research and development (R&D), the proximity-concentration hypothesis would argue against FDI (or, at the least, geographically-diffused FDI, since pockets of research excellence may exist in more than one location). Given that emerging economies have now become important contributors to the advancement of science and technology in their own right, one can further test this group of hypotheses by including variables directly related to the home country's capabilities in science and technology, such as the number of patents granted, or through other indirect measures of innovative capacity, such as the percentage of the population attaining a tertiary education or the number of engineering graduates in the population. Financial access can also be captured via measures of international financial openness (by, for example, private capital flows as a share of GDP) or the level of domestic financial development (by, for instance, the ratio of stock-market capitalization to GDP).
Innovation in the host country may also serve as a justification for M&A. This class of theories, which focuses on the potential for FDI to facilitate technological and other types of spillovers (Ethier 1986; Fosfuri, Motta & Rønde 2001; Havránek & Isová 2012; Rodríguez-Clare 1996) , suggests that the desire for technological and knowledge transfer could motivate emerging market firms to acquire firms in an advanced economy. At the same time, emerging-market firms may have specialized managerial and operational expertise which the firms could spillover to markets very similar in nature to their home markets. This technology transfer hypothesis argues that it is not only the home country's innovative capacity that may influence M&A choices, but also that of the host country.
Finally, political and policy factors may play a role in international M&A as well. Possibly the most likely channel where public policy could affect M&A deal flows is the residual accumulation of reserves as a consequence of existing trade patterns. In addition, policy factors that may affect M&A could take other forms, such as the presence of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) (Büthe & Milner 2008; Neumayer & Spess 2005) , or risks associated with economic policy or political conditions (Busse & Hefeker 2007) . Accordingly, we cluster these variables into the class of political economy explanations, which we consider in our empirical work.
Data Description and Econometric Methodology 4.1 Data sources and description
The cross-border M&A investment database used for this paper was compiled from a variety of sources. The primary data for M&A deals were drawn from a larger dataset compiled by Thompson-Reuters SDC Platinum, which covers all publicly disclosed cross-border transactions for which the ultimate acquiring company was based in an emerging-market country, and the immediate target company was located in a country other than that of the ultimate acquirer.
Transactions that were included involved either two or more companies pooling their assets to form a new entity (a merger ), or a foreign company gaining a portion of a domestic company (an acquisition). All completed and partially completed deals were included, as well as intended and pending deals announced after September 1, 2009. The definition of a cross-border M&A transaction used in this paper includes any deal where any equity stake is obtained by the acquirer firm. 8 When no deals were recorded for any country and year, the dependent variable was coded as zero. 9 The compilation resulted in a working database that covers some 10,000 companies from 61 emerging-market economies, over the period between 1997 and 2010.
These were merged with the main independent variables of interest and additional controls, which were drawn from a variety of additional sources. These include macroeconomic 
Econometric specification and estimation
The econometric model we use is an augmented gravity model that specifies that the number of cross-border M&A deals originating in country i ("home") and destined for country j ("host") at time t, M ijt , is a function of each country's output in that period, Y it and Y jt , the (timeinvariant) bilateral distance between them, D ij , and additional factors:
where X and Z are vectors of home-and host-country characteristics, respectively, B is a vector of other variables capturing the bilateral economic relationship between the home and host countries, and G is a vector of additional controls representing global macroeconomic and financial conditions. To maintain parsimony, we nest the two possible host targets within (1), so that the various coefficients-β, γ, λ, φ, and ψ-are allowed to vary by host-country class (advanced, AD, or emerging, EM ), so that k = {AD, EM }.
Variables considered within X and Z are informed by the different theoretical approaches outlined in Section 3. These include, inter alia, GDP growth (corresponding to the factor proportions hypothesis), trade openness (corresponding to the proximity-concentration hypothesis), patents granted (corresponding to technology transfer arguments), and international reserve holdings (corresponding to political economy explanations). Additional variables included to account for the bilateral relationship between country pairs include factors such as the existing size of bilateral trade and the existence of a BIT between the two economies.
In our benchmark regressions, (1) was estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with two-dimensional clustering for standard errors (by country-pair and time), designed to correct for both heteroskedasticity across countries and serial correlation within countries. Because distance is time-invariant (and we are interested in the signs and magnitudes of the coefficient β 3 ), we do not introduce country-pair fixed effects. Moreover, given the inclusion of global variables, we exclude time fixed effects from the benchmark in order to minimize the incidence of multicollinearity, although we explore this possibility in our robustness checks.
Empirical Results and Robustness Checks
Benchmark results
Our benchmark results are reported in Table 1 , for three main specifications: (B1 ) A bare-bones specification that comprises the standard components of a gravity model (GDP and distance);
(B2 ) A parsimonious specification that includes only one representative variable from each family of hypotheses elaborated on in Section 3, 11 along with the main control variables such as bilateral trade flows and global macroeconomic conditions; and (B3 ) A fully specified model that includes all the variables of interest associated with the various theoretical hypotheses. 12
Although we consider the final specification, (B3 ), to be the most complete representation of
(1), the sample size is much smaller (about half of the first specification), and the goodness-of-fit improves only marginally from specification (B2 ). Nevertheless, some additional insight can be gleaned from the more stripped-down specifications. In particular, variables that are significant in a less elaborate specification typically survive the more comprehensive one (and always retain their signs). This suggests that such variables carry considerable explanatory power.
In general, the basic gravity model variables-economic size and distance-enter with highly significant coefficients (with the exception of distance in the final specification). The coefficients on both home and host GDP are positive and significant, which is consistent with theoretical priors: large economies tend to engage in a greater amount of cross-border economic activity, M&A included. In terms of magnitude, the effect is several times larger for acquisitions in developed versus emerging markets; this suggests that only firms from relatively large emerging economies have the means to pursue expansion in advanced economies through M&A. Interestingly, these relative magnitudes are reversed when considering host GDP, which means that these firms are also far more likely to pursue opportunities in larger emerging economies, compared to advanced ones.
While distance from other emerging economies-a proxy for transactions costs, which can include informational costs 13 -decreases M&A when considering emerging market targets, it actually increases when considering advanced economy firms. While seemingly paradoxical, this can be understood by recognizing that transactions costs vis-à-vis developed countries are likely to be fairly low, and so other factors are more likely to predominate in any M&A decision.
Indeed, the positive coefficient is only statistically significant in one specification, suggesting that other factors are in fact more critical. In addition, the positive and significant coefficient on bilateral trade flows corroborates this notion, since preexisting trading relationships implies lower transactions costs, which serves to facilitate greater M&A activity.
The signs and statistical significance of coefficients on the other theoretically-motivated variables suggest that many of the hypotheses put forth in Section 3 have some merit.
The level of host-country development, as measured by per capita GDP, negatively affects acquisitions in emerging destination countries, but is positive for advanced-country targets.
This would suggest that firms acquire assets in other emerging economies that have not yet attained a certain level of development-as measured by per capita GDP-so as to exploit factor price differentials (recall, the emerging economy acquirer firms in the sample typically hail from middle-income countries). Acquisitions in advanced economies, in contrast, do not offer positive wage differentials, and so the positive coefficient on per capita GDP in that case would simply mean that more developed economies tend to attract more M&As, since there are likely to be more acquisition targets available. This could especially be the case for acquisitions in services-as discussed in Section 2, deals in service-related sectors account for a significant share of all M&A activity-since countries with higher levels of per capita GDP also typically possess larger service sectors.
As expected, the greater a home country's participation in the global economy, as measured by its trade flows, the greater its M&A flows. To a lesser extent, this is also reflected by its foreign currency reserves. A country whose firms trade more frequently with advanced (emerging) economies tends to build up foreign reserves faster (slower), which makes the country's companies more (less) likely to engage in acquisitions in their target markets (hence the positive coefficient on home reserve holdings for advanced economy M&A, and conversely for emerging economy M&A).
The coefficients on trade openness in the host country are far more interesting. For acquisitions in advanced countries, less restrictive economies-as proxied by a greater degree of trade openness-will tend to attract less M&A, since emerging markets can simply choose the exporting rather than FDI route to penetrate those markets. In this sense, the two are substitutes, an interpretation entirely consistent with the proximity-concentration hypothesis. In contrast, acquisitions in emerging markets appear to be complements. Since barriers to the flow of goods and services tend to be significantly higher in most developing countries, a given marginal reduction in trade restrictiveness will have less of an effect. Thus, instead of choosing the route of exporting goods, firms export capital instead, by establishing an operational presence in such countries. The positive and significant coefficient on the distance variable for flows to advanced economies can, in fact, be viewed as further corroboration of this proximityconcentration tradeoff.
The additional measures that capture financial access also indicate that, overall, a greater level of access to finance is associated with more M&A activity. For instance, the ability of firms in the home economy to raise capital (through its domestic stock market, for example) can promote M&A, as can financial depth in the host country. By relaxing constraints to financing, barriers to horizontal firm expansion are lowered, and firms are encouraged to pursue the M&A route.
The negative and significant coefficients on the innovation variable in the host country lend little support to the technology transfer argument. Indeed, across all specifications, emerging economy firms appear to invest less in countries with more granted patents. 14 This could be, in part, because emerging economies now already account for a significant share of global innovation (Aizenman & Noy 2007; World Bank 2011) , and it is the emerging economies that engage in the technology transfer to less innovative host nations. Whatever the motivation, the evidence does suggest that, if firms choose to pursue cross-border M&A, it seems unlikely that they do so for reasons of acquiring technology.
Finally, there is some evidence that political and policy variables make a difference to M&A.
BITs are positively related to acquisitions in emerging economy country-pairs, and the magnitude of this effect is substantial (although the coefficient is only marginally statistically significant). In particular, the positive and significant effect of political stability on acquisitions in advanced countries seems to suggest that firms actively seek to lower their political-risk exposure through their M&A activities in advanced economies (since higher values of the measure indicate less risk). 15 Similarly, firms from more economically stable emerging economies are more likely to seek to diversify their exposure by acquisitions in other emerging markets.
Robustness checks
To examine the strength of the results reported in Table 1 , we experiment with two sets of additional robustness checks. The first set of checks allows for additional factors that may be associated with cross-border M&A, or alternative measures of existing variables. In the interest of space, and given the relatively good performance of the parsimonious model (B2 ), we rely on this specification as the basis for the robustness tests to follow. 16 The results of this first set of checks are reported in Table 2. In the benchmark models, per capita GDP was used as a proxy for factor prices. While doing so considerably expands the data coverage, there may be concern that this measure may be capturing other relevant factors beyond factor prices per se. For example, GDP per capita-14 One argument against this is that patents may reflect the extent to which the legal structure of the country supports patent filings, rather than innovation. While this may be true, the legal environment is controlled, in part, by our inclusion of the political risk variable. Furthermore, we regard the patent data as the best proxy that we have available for measuring innovative capacity. As an additional robustness check, however, we substitute the total patents measure with data that includes only cross-border patents granted (which arguably better controls for differences in domestic patent law). While the results are somewhat weaker, the qualitative message remains unchanged; these additional results are available on request.
15 M&A activity does not, however, appear to respond to political risk measures in South-South acquisitions. This suggests that the hypothesis that emerging market firms may exploit their comparative advantage in more challenging institutional environments is not supported by the evidence presented here, a result that has also been corroborated by others (Arita forthcoming).
16 Results obtained with the fully specified model (B3 ) were qualitatively similar, and are available from the authors on request. as a measure of the overall level of development of the host country-could reflect the overall quality of acquisition targets in a country, or perhaps the extent to which property rights of foreign entities are respected. While we have sought to account for these additional intervening effects via our controls, it is worthwhile including factor prices directly into the benchmark. This is done in column (R1 ), where we have introduced total wages paid to employees in the manufacturing sector as an additional measure of factor price differentials. The negative (and significant) coefficient further corroborates the factor proportions hypothesis, although the magnitude of the effect is quantitatively small (a reduction of one advanced economy M&A deal requires an increase in host wages of twenty percent).
To further explore the robustness of the proximity-concentration finding, we consider two perturbations to the benchmark: in column (R2 ), we substitute stock market capitalization with the stock market turnover ratio; and in column (R3 ), we add domestic credit to the private sector (as a share of GDP) to further approximate the importance of domestic financial depth. 17
As was the case in the benchmark, financial depth (whether in the home or host country), when significant, is positively associated with greater M&A (stock market turnover was statistically insignificant).
An alternative measure of host-country innovative capacity is expenditure on R&D, as a share of GDP. When we substitute the patents measure of the benchmark-shown in column (R4 )-the sample size decreases significantly, but the negative coefficient fails to reverse (although in this case it is insignificant). 18
Finally, we consider supplementing the political economy variables with two alternatives.
First, we include financial instead of political risk, as reported in column (R5 ). Home economies that experience lower levels of financial risk tend to increase their acquisitions in advanced markets-perhaps, as before, to meet diversification objectives-and the converse holds true for host economies: less risky Northern markets may attract less Southern M&A, perhaps because they offer a less attractive risk-return reward. In the final column, (R6 ), we introduce corporate bond issuance and sovereign risk of the home economy as additional factors that may influence cross-border M&A. These appear to have little effect, although the coefficient for sovereign risk is marginally (and negatively) significant.
In all of these specifications, the coefficients for the other main variables of interest remain largely unchanged.
The second set of robustness checks that we consider are different estimation strategies for the benchmark. As before, we utilize the parsimonious model (B2 ) for our analyses. Table 3 reports three alternative estimation methods that we consider. In column (E1 ), we substitute 17 Another alternative could be to substitute the de facto measure of financial openness with a de jure one, such as the Chinn & Ito (2008) index. Doing so changes the significance of the coefficient on financial openness for advanced economy acquisitions (it becomes negative and significant), results analogous to the finding for trade openness. The other coefficients are qualitatively unchanged, and we do not report this specification, although these are available on request.
18 We also considered, but do not report, the share of researchers in the population as yet another measure of innovative capacity. Again, the qualitative results remain, and details are available on request.
two-dimensional standard errors clustering with two-way fixed effects (by country-pair and time), along with Huber-White robust standard errors. In column (E2 ), we introduce threeway fixed effects (by each respective country and time), and in the third column, (E3 ), we use a random effects (RE) model with robust standard errors and errors clustered by country-pair.
The final column (E4 ) apples seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) with correlated countrypairs and a common AR(1) error. 19 The first two FE approaches allow for ever-greater levels of unobserved heterogeneity, while the latter two error components models accept somewhat less clustering in the error structure, in exchange for greater efficiency in estimation (while still correcting standard errors for the panel nature of the data); the latter approach has also been applies by others in the literature (such as, for example, Head & Ries (2008) ).
It is evident that the main results that obtained from our benchmark specifications remain unaffected by these alternative estimation approaches. It is useful to recognize that this is in spite of the far greater heterogeneity that is afforded by the fixed effects estimators (E1 ) and (E2 ). Indeed, the qualitatively consistent results reported in Table 3 suggest that the simpler (and more efficient) OLS estimation employed in our benchmark was a reasonable choice.
Will M&A flows change substantially in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis?
As discussed in Section 2, cross-border M&A flows by emerging market firms fell substantially during the later crisis period, and in the year following. The natural question that arises is whether such flows are likely to change substantially as a result of the crisis, especially with anticipated slower growth in advanced economies.
Using the model developed in Section 4, 20 we project M&A deal trends for 2010 through 2025. Obviously, forecasts of most independent variables were not available. We retained 2009 values for all but GDP and net international investment position (IIP)-related variables (specifically, GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, and net IIP, used to infer reserve holdings), and simulated the model using these assumptions for emerging and advanced aggregates. The main assumptions are summarized in Table 4 for two scenarios: a baseline where emerging economies are assumed to grow, on average, twice as fast as advanced economies; and a highgrowth scenario for emerging markets where the largest emerging countries (China, India, and Russia) grow faster than the rest of the large emerging economies (such as Brazil, Indonesia, and Korea).
The results of the two scenarios are summarized in Figure 3 . Future cross-border deals are likely to grow at a sustained, albeit slower, pace. Projections along the baseline scenario suggest that the pace of cross-border deal growth is likely to slow from the 14.3 percent annual growth rate recorded between 1998 and 2008, to an average of 8.9 percent annual growth over 2010- , clustered by country-pair (third specification), are reported in parentheses. Global controls and a constant term were included in the regressions, but not reported. * indicates significance at 10 percent level, * * indicates significance at 5 percent level, and * * * indicates significance at 1 percent level. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the factors associated with bilateral M&A activity by emerging market firms. Our main finding is that these firms' decisions to pursue acquisition targets depend critically on whether they are investing in advanced or emerging market targets. Southern acquisitions tend to be located in countries with lower levels of per capita income, which likely reflects a desire to take advantage of lower wage costs in those countries. Acquisitions of Northern targets, in contrast, occur in greater frequency when these host countries are more closed to trade, which suggests that such deals may be due to an implicit tradeoff that favors siting production directly in the country, rather than exporting to it.
Another important insight that emerges from the analysis is that firms appear to seek to diversify their equity holdings through acquisitions. More specifically, while emerging economy acquirers are likely to be located in economically less volatile economies, they tend to seek out targets in advanced economies that exhibit both lower levels of political risk (to insure the protection of their investments), but higher levels of economic and financial risk (possibly because such economies can offer better returns). The extent to which such diversification occurs is also materially affected by economic policies, such as those governing bilateral investment or financial access.
In light of this, emerging market firms are likely to press for future economic policies that will strengthen investment climates both at home and abroad. In doing so, emerging market firms can act as catalysts that spur increased integration of developing countries into the global economy, since enhanced integration offers additional support for open trading and investment regimes. But these firms will also serve as a growing source of global competition, especially when they invest in other emerging economies. Emerging market acquisitions are increasingly driven by resource-and efficiency-seeking motives-motives traditionally considered the preserve of firms based in advanced countries-and in making such cross-border investments, these firms will also challenge advanced-country firms' preeminence in industrial production. Such competition will, in the longer run, drive global factor price equalization in general, and wage convergence in particular. Countries can support such positive competition by enhancing financial access within their countries, which is also positively associated with cross-border M&A.
The slow post-crisis recovery in the developed world, coupled with the relatively rapid recovery in the developing one, has underscored the future economic potential of emerging markets. Projections of post-crisis M&A volume by emerging market firms suggest that future M&A activity, while moderating somewhat, is likely to remain fairly robust. Emerging market firms are thus likely to be at the forefront of this process of global economic convergence, and are fast becoming a potent force for globalization in their own right. Future research in this area will do well to study how the economic behavior of such globalized emerging market multinationals may differ from those of advanced country corporations, beyond their choices in cross-border M&A.
Technical Appendix Projection Model Details
Our M&A growth projections are based on a modified version of the model (1), and is designed to minimize data requirements for forward variables while maximizing the fit of the model to historical data. We use specification (B3 ) in Table 1 Additional Tables Panama † The definition of emerging economies used in the paper were chosen on the basis of markets traditionally classified as emerging by investment banks, and to illustrate the economies that were distinct from the historically advanced economies of North America, Western Europe, Japan, and Oceania. China data aggregate the mainland and the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. 
